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KLEIN VS MEHRTENS: RESTORING THE
REPUTATION OF A GREAT MODERN
JACQUES BAIR, PIOTR B LASZCZYK, PETER HEINIG, MIKHAIL G. KATZ,
JAN PETER SCHA¨FERMEYER, AND DAVID SHERRY
Abstract. Historian Herbert Mehrtens sought to portray the his-
tory of turn-of-the-century mathematics as a struggle of modern vs
countermodern, led respectively by David Hilbert and Felix Klein.
Some of Mehrtens’ conclusions have been picked up by both histo-
rians (Jeremy Gray) and mathematicians (Frank Quinn).
We argue that Klein and Hilbert, both at Go¨ttingen, were not
adversaries but rather modernist allies in a bid to broaden the
scope of mathematics beyond a narrow focus on arithmetized anal-
ysis as practiced by the Berlin school.
Klein’s Go¨ttingen lecture and other texts shed light on Klein’s
modernism. Hilbert’s views on intuition are closer to Klein’s views
than Mehrtens is willing to allow. Klein and Hilbert were equally
interested in the axiomatisation of physics. Among Klein’s credits
is helping launch the career of Abraham Fraenkel, and advancing
the careers of Sophus Lie, Emmy Noether, and Ernst Zermelo, all
four surely of impeccable modernist credentials.
Mehrtens’ unsourced claim that Hilbert was interested in pro-
duction rather than meaning appears to stem fromMehrtens’ marx-
ist leanings. Mehrtens’ claim that [the future SS-Brigadefu¨hrer ]
“Theodor Vahlen . . . cited Klein’s racist distinctions within math-
ematics, and sharpened them into open antisemitism” fabricates a
spurious continuity between the two figures mentioned and is thus
an odious misrepresentation of Klein’s position.
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This may be regarded as a continuation of the Klein
Erlanger Programm, in the sense that a geometrical
space with its group of transformations is generalized
to a category with its algebra of mappings.
Eilenberg–MacLane [16, p. 237] in 1945
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1. Felix Klein
Historian Herbert Mehrtens sought to portray the history of turn-of-
the-century mathematics as a struggle of modern vs countermodern,
represented respectively by David Hilbert and Felix Klein; see e.g.,
Mehrtens [39]. Some of Mehrtens’ conclusions have been picked up
by both historians (e.g., Jeremy Gray [18]) and mathematicians (e.g.,
Frank Quinn [46]).
To be sure, notable differences in outlook existed between Hilbert
and Klein. Thus, Hilbert did not share Klein’s intense interest in the
history of mathematics (see e.g., Rowe [53, p. 192]), and Klein was less
interested in axiomatics than Hilbert (see e.g., Weyl [63, p. 16]). How-
ever, such differences though undeniable were extrapolated by scholars
like Mehrtens to extravagant proportions.
Against Mehrtens, we argue that Klein and Hilbert were not ad-
versaries but rather modernist allies in a bid to broaden the scope of
mathematics beyond a narrow focus on arithmetized analysis as prac-
ticed by the Berlin school, so as to include set theory, axiomatisation
of physics, and other innovative directions. To this end, we analyze
Klein’s Go¨ttingen lecture [30] and other texts.
Felix Klein’s 1895 Go¨ttingen address was as influential as it is ap-
parently controversial, as we will see in later sections.
1.1. The Go¨ttingen address. Here Klein spoke of
an important mathematical tendency which has as its
chief exponent Weierstrass. . . I refer to the arithmetiz-
ing of mathematics. [30, p. 241] (emphasis in the origi-
nal)
The passage makes clear Klein’s appreciation of the significance of the
framework developed by Weierstrass and others. According to Klein,
the framework constituted an advance over earlier reliance on spatial
intuition as a basis for proofs:
Gauss, taking for granted the continuity of space, un-
hesitatingly used space intuition as a basis for his proofs;
but closer investigation showed not only that many spe-
cial points still needed proof, but also that space intu-
ition had led to the too hasty assumption of the gen-
erality of certain theorems which are by no means gen-
eral. Hence arose the demand for exclusively arithmeti-
cal methods of proof. . . (ibid.)
The break with Gauss’ view is particularly significant and underscores
the modernity of Klein’s. Such “arithmetical methods” meant that
4 J. B., P. B., P. H., M. K., J. S., AND D. S.
nothing shall be accepted as a part of the science unless
its rigorous truth1 can be clearly demonstrated by the
ordinary operations of analysis. (ibid.)
Although vague notions, like magnitude, continuous variable, etc., were
still in use in these new developments, Klein believed that further re-
finements could be introduced through the limitations on the notion
of quantity (as in Kronecker’s approach) or through the application
of symbolic language (the approach of Peano and his school). Klein
continued:
Thus, as you see, while voluntarily acknowledging the
exceptional importance of the tendency, I do not grant
that the arithmetized science is the essence of mathe-
matics. . . I consider that the essential point is not the
mere putting of the argument into the arithmetical form,
but the mere rigid logic obtained by means of this form.
(ibid., p. 242)
Klein felt that the pursuit of abstraction is an open-ended process that
need not stop with Weierstrass. Klein’s enthusiasm for the arithme-
tization of analysis was evident. Also in evidence is his appreciation
of new logical and (as we will show below) foundational studies, even
though the term logic did not have the meaning we attach to it today.2
It is in this context that we should view Klein’s further claim to the
effect that
it is not possible to treat mathematics exhaustively by
the method of logical deduction alone, but that, even
at the present time, intuition has its special province.
(ibid., p. 242) (emphasis added)
1The phrase “rigorous truth’ is meaningless according to contemporary usage in
modern mathematics, and is a mistranslation found in Isabel Maddison’s (on the
whole adequate) translation. Felix Klein wrote, in remarkably modern phras-
ing: “. . . die Forderung ausschließlich arithmetischer Beweisfu¨hrung [ist:] Als
Besitzstand der Wissenschaft soll nur angesehen werden, was durch Anwendung
der gewo¨hnlichen Rechnungsoperationen als identisch richtig klar erwiesen werden
kann.” [emphasis added] A correct translation of Klein’s words is ‘. . . the demand
of exclusively arithmetical proofs [is:] only those propositions are to be considered
the secure possession of science which can clearly be demonstrated to be identi-
cally valid by applying the usual arithmetical operations.’ In particular, Klein’s
‘identisch richtig’ (which Maddison rendered as ‘rigorous truth’) is the German
equivalent of the English ‘identically valid’.
2In this area Klein was more of an enabler of new mathematics than a direct
contributor ; he expressed his personal preference as follows: “symbolic methods. . .
this subject does not appeal to me personally” (ibid., p. 243).
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We will deal with Klein’s stance on intuition (mentioned in the com-
ment just cited) in Section 1.2 immediately following.
1.2. Spatial intuition. In the remainder of his address, Klein seeks
to place the role of spatial intuition in relation to logical and axiomatic
developments. Klein is somewhat ambiguous as to the meaning he at-
taches to the term intuition. One can single out three possible mean-
ings:
(1) intuition as an indispensable tool in research;3
(2) intuition as an indispensable tool in teaching;4
(3) axiomatic accounts are insufficient and intuition must play its
role in mathematical arguments.5
What we wish to emphasize is that even if meaning (3) occurs here at
all, it occurs on a sophisticated level as indicated by Klein’s endorse-
ment of the arithmetic foundations for analysis (therefore no more in-
tuitive talk of real numbers) and his comments on Green’s theorem and
electricity (emphasizing that physical intuition is insufficient to prove
mathematical theorems); see Section 1.5. Klein’s comment on Gauss
quoted in Section 1.1 indicates that Klein clearly distanced himself
from a reliance on spatial intuition as replacement for analysis. Even
if at some sophisticated level Klein thought that axiomatic approach
will be insufficient, no investigation of such a possible level of Klein’s
term intuition appears in Mehrtens’s book, which contains little indi-
cation that he would actually have the mathematical wherewithal to
carry out such an investigation. The level of mathematical compe-
tence possessed by Mehrtens is illustrated by his comment that “if it
were possible to represent pi by an algebraic equation, then the con-
struction [i.e., squaring the circle] would be possible with compass and
3As when Klein writes: “I might now introduce a historical excursus, showing that
in the development of most of the branches of our science, intuition was the starting
point, while logical treatment followed” [30, p. 246].
4As when Klein writes: “Among the teachers in our Gymnasia the need of math-
ematical instruction based on intuitive methods has now been so strongly and
universally emphasized that one is compelled to enter a protest, and vigorously
insist on the necessity for strict logical treatment. This is the central thought of
a small pamphlet on elementary geometrical problems which I published last sum-
mer. Among the university professors of our subject exactly the reverse is the case;
intuition is frequently not only undervalued, but as much as possible ignored” [30,
p. 248].
5As when Klein writes: “On the other hand I have to point out most emphatically–
and this is the negative part of my task–that it is not possible to treat mathematics
exhaustively by the method of logical deduction alone, but that, even at the present
time, intuition has its special province” [30, p. 242].
6 J. B., P. B., P. H., M. K., J. S., AND D. S.
straightedge” [39, p. 111]. This amounts to an incorrect claim to the
effect that every algebraic number is constructible ( 3
√
2 is algebraic but
non-constructible).
Klein felt that arithmetization of geometry meant that geometrical
objects are given by formulas and are dealt with by means of analytic
geometry and analytic methods:
The arithmetizing of mathematics began originally, as I
pointed out, by ousting space intuition; the first prob-
lem that confronts us as we turn to geometry is therefore
that of reconciling the results obtained by arithmetical
methods with our conception of space. By this I mean
that we accept the ordinary principles of analytical ge-
ometry, and try to find from these the geometrical inter-
pretation of the more modern analytical developments.
[30, p. 243]
The obvious advantage consists in the refinement of space intuition:
The net result is, on the one hand, a refinement of the
process of space intuition; and on the other, an advan-
tage due to the clearer view that is hereby obtained of
the analytical results considered, with the consequent
elimination of the paradoxical character that is other-
wise apt to attach itself to them. (ibid., p. 243)
The next advantage is idealisation, namely a mathematical form of an
imprecise intuition:
We ultimately perceive that space intuition is an inexact
conception, and that in order that we may subject it
to mathematical treatment, we idealize it by means of
the so-called axioms, which actually serve as postulates.
(ibid., p. 243–244; emphasis added)
1.3. Idealisation in physics. As for idealisation in mechanics and
mathematical physics, Klein writes:
Throughout applied mathematics, as in the case of space
intuition, we must idealize natural objects before we can
use them for purposes of mathematical argument; but
we find continually that in one and the same subject we
may idealize objects in different ways, according to the
purpose that we have in view. (ibid., p. 244)
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In the realm of practical physics, idealisation provides precisely defined
objects like Green’s function (see Section 1.5), that enable new phys-
ical insights as well as abstract mathematical arguments. Yet Klein’s
intuition is twofold:
. . . [1] the cultivated intuition just discussed, which has
been developed under the influence of logical deduction
and might almost be called a form of memory; but rather
of [2] the na¨ıve intuition, largely a natural gift, which is
unconsciously increased by minute study of one branch
or other of the science. (ibid., p. 245–246)
Klein elaborates as follows:
The word intuition (Anschauung) is perhaps not well
chosen; I mean it to include that instinctive feeling for
the proportion of the moving parts with which the engi-
neer criticises the distribution of power in any piece of
mechanism he has constructed; and even that indefinite
conviction the practiced calculator possesses as to the
convergence of any infinite process that lies before him.
I maintain that mathematical intuition - so understood
- is always far in advance of logical reasoning and covers
a wider field. (ibid.)
Thus Klein’s intuition [1] is cultivated (under the influence of logical
deduction), while intuition [2] is the most basic in his vision of mathe-
matics, namely prelogical:
Logical investigation is not in place until intuition has
completed the task of idealisation. (ibid., p. 247)
Klein finds confirmation of the idea that intuition was the starting
point, whereas logical treatment followed, not only in the historical
origins of infinitesimal calculus, but also in Minkowski’s development
of the theory of numbers.
As for the intuition [2] and pedagogy, Klein writes that
two classes at least of mathematical lectures must be
based on intuition; the elementary lectures which ac-
tually introduce the beginner to higher mathematics -
for the scholar must naturally follow the same course
of development on a smaller scale, that the science it-
self has taken on a larger - and the lectures which are
intended for those whose work is largely done by intu-
itive methods, namely, natural scientists and engineers.
(ibid., p. 248)
8 J. B., P. B., P. H., M. K., J. S., AND D. S.
To be sure, Klein’s speculations on intuition are not profound; mod-
ern philosophers may find them problematic. Our goal here is not to
argue that Klein was a great philosopher but rather to indicate that
his preoccupations were those of modern mathematicians. If Mehrtens
wishes to champion the cause of specifically modern mathematics, he
cannot easily dismiss today’s mathematicians as being just as counter-
modern with regard to intuition as he claims Klein is. Today mathe-
maticians are still struggling with the role of intuition in the creative
process.
1.4. Attitude toward logic and foundations. Klein recognized the
significance of the contemporary developments in logic associated with
the names of Peano and others, when he spoke of
efforts made to introduce symbols for the different log-
ical processes,6 in order to get rid of the association of
ideas, and the lack of accuracy which creeps in unno-
ticed, and therefore not allowed for, when ordinary lan-
guage is used. In this connection special mention must
be made of an Italian mathematician, Peano, of Turin. . .
[30, p. 242]
Klein’s warm relationship with Pasch (see Schlimm [55]) further at-
tests to Klein’s visionary appreciation of contemporary developments
in axiomatic foundations. At the same time, Klein voiced a cautionary
note: “while voluntarily acknowledging the exceptional importance of
the tendency, I do not grant that the arithmetized science is the essence
of mathematics” (see Section 1.1 for a longer quotation). To Klein, the
significance of the new methodology goes hand in hand with a rejection
of 19th century methodology:
From this outline of the new geometrical programme you
see that it differs greatly from any that was accepted
during the first half of this [i.e., 19th] century. . . (ibid.,
p. 244)
Contrary to earlier ideas of mathematics as being a representation of
reality, Klein is clearly aware of the idealizing nature of mathematical
treatments, as shown by the passage quoted at the beginning of Sec-
tion 1.3. As an example, Klein gives the possibility of idealizing matter
by either continuous or discrete representations:
6In the original: “logischen Verknu¨pfung”. A better translation would be “logi-
cal connectives”. While Verknu¨pfung is often translated as operation in algebraic
contexts, the most accurate translation in contemporary discussions of logic is con-
nective.
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we treat matter either as continuous throughout space,
or as made up of separate molecules, which we may con-
sider to be either at rest or in rapid motion. (ibid.,
p. 245)
If matter could admit distinct mathematical representations according
to Klein, then clearly Klein did not share the naive earlier view of
mathematics as a straightforward representation of reality.
1.5. Klein on Green’s function. Klein goes on to note the distinc-
tion between, on the one hand, a physical phenomenon and, on the
other, a mathematical theorem attempting to capture the latter. He il-
lustrates such a distinction by citing the example that “in electricity. . .
a conductor under the influence of a charged point is in a state of elec-
trical equilibrium” whose mathematical counterpart is the existence of
Green’s function, and concludes:
You see here what is the precise object of these renewed
investigations; not any new physical insight, but ab-
stract mathematical argument in itself, on account of
the clearness and precision which will thereby be added
to our view of the experimental facts. (ibid.; emphasis
added)
It emerges that according to Klein the ultimate criterion of the validity
of a theorem is “mathematical argument” rather than physical insight.
1.6. Pedagogy. Going on to pedagogy, Klein notes: “I must add a
few words on mathematics from the point of view of pedagogy” (ibid.,
p. 247). University professors bear the brunt of Klein’s critique:
Among the university professors of our subject exactly
the reverse is the case; intuition is frequently not only
undervalued, but as much as possible ignored. This
is doubtless a consequence of the intrinsic importance
of the arithmetizing tendency in modern mathematics.
But the result reaches far beyond the mark. It is high
time to assert openly once for all that this implies, not
only a false pedagogy, but also a distorted view of the
science. (ibid., p. 248) (emphasis added)
While cautious about possible deleterious effects on pedagogy, Klein
welcomed the arithmetizing tendency where appropriate, and made
common cause with Hilbert in most cases.
The visionary nature of Klein’s Erlangen program (EP) is widely
known and acknowledged even by Gray (see Section 4.1) though not
by Mehrtens (see Section 3). A major weakness of Mehrtens’ book is his
10 J. B., P. B., P. H., M. K., J. S., AND D. S.
failure to address the importance of category theory in modern mathe-
matics. The EP focused on transformations of objects rather than ob-
jects themselves, a viewpoint recognizable as a foundation rock of the
category-theoretic approach; see Marquis [37]. What is remarkable is
that even Mehrtens’ nemesis Bieberbach acknowledged that the EP was
a precursor of the axiomatic method (see Segal [57, p. 347, note 56]).
The EP furnishes clear evidence in favor of Klein’s modernism and lack
of recognition of this by Mehrtens constitutes massaging of evidence.
1.7. Klein on infinitesimal analysis. Klein’s foresight of the even-
tual success of infinitesimal analysis in modern mathematics is simi-
larly remarkable. Thus, Klein formulated a criterion for what it would
take for a continuum incorporating infinitesimals to furnish a success-
ful framework, in terms of the availability of a mean value theorem in
the framework; see Klein [31, p. 213]. Klein’s criterion was endorsed by
Abraham Fraenkel [17, pp. 116–117]. Such a continuum was eventually
developed by Fraenkel’s student Abraham Robinson [49]; see Kanovei
et al. [27] for details.
The proposal of Vinsonhaler [61], Katz–Polev [28], and others for
teaching calculus with infinitesimals relies on their intuitive appeal and
would have likely met with Klein’s approval. Modern frameworks for
infinitesimal analysis occasioned a re-evalulation of its history; see e.g.,
Bair et al. [1], Bascelli et al. [3], [4], B laszczyk et al. [8].
1.8. Courant on the Erlangen Program. Courant wrote:
This so-called Erlangen Program, entitled ‘Comparative
Considerations on recent geometrical research’ has be-
come perhaps the most influential and most-read math-
ematical text of the last 60 years.
Since the end of the 18th century, geometry had ex-
traordinarily thrived in France and Germany. Along-
side old elementary geometry and analytical geometry,
a large number of geometrical considerations had [been]
developed, which stood side-by-side unmotivated and
without mutual connections, and in this tangle [of ideas]
even an expert could hardly orient themselves anymore.
Klein felt the need to bring a uniform ordering principle
into this chaos, and he has solved this task for the whole
of geometry in way which one currently cannot imagine
coming nearer to being complete. The magic wand, with
which here Klein created order, was the group concept.
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It [the group concept] permits to conceive every class
of geometrical investigations (like Euclidean and Non-
Euclidean geometry, projective geometry, line- and sphere-
geometry, Riemannian geometry and topology) as in-
variant theory relative to a given group of geometrical
transformations. The Erlangen Program constitutes for
geometry a similarly forceful ordering-principle as the
periodic system is for chemistry.
To this day, no geometrical theory can be considered
finished if it cannot clearly assert its place within the
framework of the Erlangen Program. Klein lived to have
the satisfaction, fifty years later, to be able to very sub-
stantially contribute to the clarification of the mathe-
matical foundations of relativity theory, simply by, es-
sentially, applying his old thoughts from the Erlangen
program to the new questions. (Courant [15, p. 200])
Courant’s comments clearly indicate the modern nature of Klein’s EP.
1.9. Hermann Weyl on Riemann surfaces. Hermann Weyl com-
ments as follows on the significance of the work of Riemann on what
are now called Riemann surfaces, and its clarification by Klein:
It has to be admitted, of course, that Riemann himself
slightly disguised the true relationship between [com-
plex] functions and Riemann surfaces, by the form of his
presentation—perhaps for the one reason only that he
did not want to visit overly alien ideas upon his contem-
poraries; he disguised this relationship in particular by
only speaking of those multi-sheeted Riemann-surfaces
covering the plane which have finitely many ramification
points, which [by the way] even today are those which
one primarily thinks of when the topic of Riemann sur-
faces is mentioned, and that Riemann did not use the
more general idea (which only later was developed to
transparent clarity by K l e i n), an idea whose character-
istic property can be described as follows: any connec-
tion with the complex plane, and generally any connec-
tion with three-dimensional point-spaces has been sev-
ered, and severed in principle. And yet, without any
possible doubt, only with Klein’s conception does the
basic thought of Riemann come to life and is the natu-
ral simplicity, vitality and effective force of these ideas
12 J. B., P. B., P. H., M. K., J. S., AND D. S.
made visible. The present work is based on these [i.e.,
Klein’s] thoughts. (Weyl [62, p. V]; emphasis added)
Klein’s role in Weyl’s project was instrumental:
The most important of the basic thoughts [in Weyl’s
book] are due to the man to whom I was permitted to
dedicate this book in sincere and profound reference.
Geheimrat7 Klein has insisted, despite being overbur-
dened by other tasks, and despite his failing health, to
discuss the entire subject matter in frequent meetings
with me; I owe a great debt of gratitude to him for his
remarks which on several occasions have caused me to
replace my initial presentation with a more correct and
suitable one. (ibid., p. IX)
Weyl makes it clear that Klein made great sacrifices of time and en-
ergy to support the first abstract and axiomatic (and hence textbook-
modern) presentation of the theory of Riemann surfaces. This is a
factual argument against Mehrtens’ counter-Klein thesis analyzed in
Section 3.
2. Karl Weierstrass (1815–1897)
The seminal contribution of Karl Weierstrass to the development of
modern analysis is well known and requires no special comment. In
this section we will focus on Weierstrass’ comments on intuition and
ethnicity, and compare them to Klein’s.
2.1. Letter to Kovalevskaya. Sanford Segal notes that Weierstrass’
1883 letter to his student Kovalevskaya was cited by SA footsoldier
Teichmu¨ller in a 1938 lecture; see Segal [57, p. 405]. In his letter,
Weierstrass expressed himself as follows:
Among the older mathematicians there are different sorts
of human beings; this is a trivial proposition, which nev-
ertheless explains much. My dear friend Kummer, for
example, was not interested in what happened in math-
ematics as a whole, neither while he applied all his en-
ergy to find the proofs of the higher reciprocity laws,
nor, and then less than ever, after he had expended his
energies in these pursuits. His attitude [to new develop-
ments in mathematics] is, if not dismissive, indifferent.
If you tell him that Euclidean Geometry is based on
an unproved hypothesis, then he [readily] admits this;
7Often translated as privy councillor.
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[but] to proceed from this insight to asking the question
‘How does geometry develop without this hypothesis?’,
now that is contrary to his [mental] nature, and the ex-
ertions aimed at this question, and the general investiga-
tions which follow from this question and which liberate
themselves from what is empirically given or assumed,
are moot speculations to him, or even an abomination.
(from an 1883 letter from Weierstrass to Kovalevskaya
reproduced in Mittag-Leffler [43, p. 148–150]; transla-
tion ours)
Having thus analyzed Kummer, Weierstrass goes on to provide his in-
sights into Kronecker’s temperament:
Kronecker is different, he familiarizes himself quickly
with everything that is new, his facility of perception
enables him to do so, but it does not happen deeply; he
does not have the talent to apply the same interest to
good work of others as to his own work. (ibid.)
Weierstrass then proposes the following analysis of such differences in
mathematical temperaments:
This is compounded by a defect which can be found in
many very intelligent people, especially those from the
semitic tribe[;]8 he [i.e., Kronecker] does not have suffi-
cient imagination (I should rather say: intuition) and it
is true to say that a mathematician who is not a little
bit of a poet, will never be a consummate mathemati-
cian. Comparisons are instructive: the all-encompassing
view which is directed towards the Highest, the Ideal,9
marks out, in a very striking manner, Abel as better
than Jacobi, marks out Riemann as better than all his
contemporaries (Eisenstein, Rosenhain), and marks out
Helmholtz as better than Kirchhoff (even though the
8Rowe translates Stamm as “stock” but “tribe” seems both more accurate and more
consistent with Weierstrass’ tone in the letter.
9Rowe translates Weierstrass’ phrase “allumfassende auf das ho¨chste, das Ideale
gerichteten Blick” as “all-embracing vision focused on the loftiest of ideals” but the
translation is incorrect. Weierstrass is not using ‘ho¨chste’ as an adjective modifying
‘Ideale’; rather, Weierstrass uses a juxtaposition of a neuter nominalized superlative
(‘das ho¨chste’) with a neuter nominalized adjective (‘das Ideale’), separating the
two by a comma instead of the conjunction ‘and’, to create a rhetorical effect in his
letter.
14 J. B., P. B., P. H., M. K., J. S., AND D. S.
latter did not have a droplet of semitic blood).10 (ibid.;
emphasis added)
Notes Rowe: “These remarks, echoed in the very same stereotypes set
forth by anti-Semites like Dingler and Bieberbach fifty years later, are
a good illustration of how deeply rooted such thinking was in German
culture” (Rowe [52, p. 443]).
Weierstrass’ speculations as to the insufficient endowment in intu-
ition on the part of the semitic tribe marks out Weierstrass as a better
candidate than Klein (who never proffered such speculations) for coun-
termodern leadership, by Mehrtens’ own standards. We would like to
suggest that Mehrtens’ book is critically flawed in having misidentified
its protagonists: while Hilbert can serviceably provide modern leader-
ship, his opposite numbers at the helm of the intuitive countermoderns
should have been Weierstrass and his students (see Bair et al. [2]) rather
than Klein.
We would like to clarify that Weierstrass made these comments in a
private letter, and did not anticipate that his classification will be am-
plified through publication by Mittag-Leffler. Klein, on the other hand,
made his comments on Teutonic, Latin and Hebrew characteristics (see
Section 4.9) in a public address (Klein [29]). It is unclear whether
Mehrtens would characterize Weierstrass’ comments as biologistisch-
rassistische.11
2.2. Weierstrass and Klein on Kronecker. In Section 2.1 we ob-
served that Karl Weierstrass attributed perceived shortcomings of Kro-
necker’s mathematical outlook to the latter’s membership in the semitic
tribe with an attendant deficiency in intuition. Weierstrass’ remarks
on Kronecker can be profitably compared with those made by Klein,
in a letter to Friedrich Althoff, “the kingpin of the Prussian university
system” (see Rowe [52, p. 424]), concerning mathematics at Berlin:
Without question the positive aspects have been borne
primarily by Kronecker. In this respect I must not with-
hold my praise. That Kronecker, even his last years of
10In the original: “Dazu kommt ein Mangel, der sich bei vielen ho¨chst versta¨ndigen
Menschen, namentlich bei denen semitischen Stammes findet[;] er besitzt nicht aus-
reichend Phantasie (Intuition mo¨chte ich lieber sagen) und es ist wahr, ein Mathe-
matiker, der nicht etwas Poet ist, wird nimmer ein vollkommener Mathematiker
sein. Vergleiche sind lehrreich: Der allumfassende auf das ho¨chste, das Ideale
gerichtete Blick zeichnet Abel vor Jacobi, Riemann vor allen seinen Zeitgenossen
(Eisenstein, Rosenhain), Helmholtz vor Kirchhoff (obwohl bei dem letztern kein
Tro¨pfchen semitischen Blutes vorhanden) in ganz eclatanter Weise aus.”
11See note 25 in Section 4.3.
KLEIN VS MEHRTENS: RESTORING THE REPUTATION OF A MODERN 15
life, was able to bring new ideas to our science with
such youthful ambition, and thereby to uphold Berlin’s
old fame as a center for mathematical research in a
new form, that is an accomplishment one can only ad-
mire without reservation. My critique merely concerns
the one-sidedness with which Kronecker, from a philo-
sophical standpoint, fought against various scientific di-
rections that were remote from his own. . . This one-
sidedness was probably less grounded in Kronecker’s
original talents than it was in the disposition of his
character. Unconditional mastery, if possible over all of
German mathematics, became more and more the goal
which he pursued with all the cleverness and tenacity
he could muster. Little wonder that there is no one to
take his place now that he has left the arena. (Klein to
Althoff, as quoted in Rowe [52, p. 442])
Regardless of whether one agrees with Klein’s assessment of Kronecker’s
mathematics and/or politics, one has to acknowledge that from the
viewpoint of racial harmony, Klein’s remarks are unobjectionable; Kro-
necker’s relation to what Weierstrass referred to as the semitic tribe is
not mentioned. Whenever Klein did mention a mathematician’s Jew-
ishness, it was in laudatory terms like the following:
Personally, [James Joseph] Sylvester was extremely en-
gaging, witty and effervescent. He was a brilliant orator
and often distinguished himself by his pithy, agile po-
etic skill, to the mirth of everyone. By his brilliance
and agility of mind he was a genuine representative of
his race; he hailed from a purely Jewish family, which,
having been nameless before, had adopted the [sur]name
Sylvester only in his generation. (Klein [32, p. 163])
Klein’s philosemitic comments in this area stand in contrast with those
penned by Weierstrass and cited in Section 2.1, as well as those penned
by Vahlen and cited in Section 4.6.
2.3. Letter to Schwarz. Weierstrass opposed the looming appoint-
ment of Sophus Lie at Leipzig on the grounds that the foreigner Lie
was not of such consequence as to warrant a passing over of actual
countrymen (i.e., compatriots); see Stubhaug [60, p. 317]. Weierstrass
went on to express his scorn in a 1885 letter written from Lake Geneva
to his student Schwarz at Go¨ttingen, in the following terms:
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Du Bois-Reymond really sometimes nails it; years ago
already he called the Trifolium of Klein–Lie–Mayer an
‘acolyte society.12 (Weierstrass as cited in Confalonieri
[10, p. 288])
The nailing comment is followed by a piece of advice for Schwarz:
But, dear friend, don’t let yourself be led astray, go on to
correctly walk your walk, teach and work in your thor-
ough style—thus you will best counteract the swindle,13
even though initially, you will have to brace yourself for
this, the big crowd14 will turn to the newly rising sun.15
(Weierstrass as cited in Confalonieri [10, p. 288])
Weierstrass appears to be mixing metaphors here. The sunflower fol-
lows the sun, just as a crowd blindly follows a new fad. Weierstrass’
newly rising sun appears to refer to Klein.
These comments by Weierstrass are significant because they indicate
that he had a fundamental disagreement with Klein over the nature
and future of mathematics. Weierstrass seems to have viewed Klein’s
interests such as the Erlangen program as a passing fad (that goes
away as quickly as the sun sets). Huygens had similar feelings about
Leibniz’ calculus, in that he thought it was merely a repackaging of
existing techniques.
3. Mehrtens on Klein
In november 1933 philosopher Hugo Dingler filed a pamphlet against
Klein (1849–1925).
3.1. Dingler’s pamphlet; J-type and S-type. In his pamphlet,
Dingler claims that Klein was half-Jewish, that Klein filled Go¨ttingen
12In the original: “Du Bois-Reymond trifft doch zuweilen den Nagel auf den Kopf,
er nannte vor Jahren schon das Trifolium Klein–Lie–Mayer ‘socie´te´ thurife´raire’.”
13In the original: “Schwindel”. Weierstrass’ term apparently refers to the activity
of the Klein–Lie–Mayer society and connects well with Weierstrass’ epithet Blender
used by Weierstrass in 1892 in reference to Klein.
14The words “der große Heifer” in Confalonieri’s transcription are possibly a cor-
ruption of “der große Haufen”. Weierstrass’ manuscript shows a black speck above
the squiggly line representing this word. The speck is most likely an overline that
was once used in German to distinguish a handwritten ‘u’ from a handwritten ‘n’.
Confalonieri seems to have mistaken the speck for a dotted ‘i’, leading him to guess
‘Heifer’ (not a word in German).
15The words “der neu mitgehenden Sonne” in Confalonieri’s transcription are pos-
sibly a corruption of “der neu aufgehenden Sonne”. Note that the word in question
starts with the glyph that Weierstrass uses for ‘a’.
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with Jews and foreigners, and that Klein was hungry for power to con-
trol German mathematics and re-make it along Jewish lines and in sum
was un-German; see Rowe [52].
3.2. Bieberbach versus Dingler. A quarter century after defending
his thesis under Klein, Ludwig Bieberbach made a claim contrary to
Dingler’s regarding Klein, with the latter now becoming emphatically
German; see Bieberbach [6]. Thus Bieberbach sought to attribute his
own (Bieberbach’s) views concerning German mathematics to Klein
himself, and to co-opt the latter in the service of an unsavory ideology.
Bieberbach relied on a dichotomy of S-type versus J-type borrowed
from Jaensch [26]. Here S-type (for Strahltypus) refers to a “radiating”
type that “only values those things in Reality which his intellect infers
in it” and moreover “denies the connection to an outer reality that is
not mentally constructed” (see Segal [57, p. 365]).
In contrast, the J-type (or I-type, for Integrationstypus) refers to one
who “is wide-open to Reality” and “lets the influence of experience
stream into him” (see Segal [57, 362–363] for details).
The Jews Jacobi and Landau among others was construed as S-types,
whereas Klein as a J-type. On occasion, Bieberbach used the terms
Aryan and non-Aryan [7, p. 177]; for further discussion see Segal [57,
p. 380].
3.3. Mehrtens’ choice; C-type and M-type. Over half a century
later, historian Herbert Mehrtens chose to back Bieberbach in the
Dingler–Bieberbach disagreement over Klein.16 The historian confi-
dently announced that “Klein is indeed a representative of counter-
modernism” (Mehrtens [41, p. 520]). What Mehrtens found counter-
modern in Klein is Klein’s mathematical outlook rather than his math-
ematical output.
To contrast Klein with Hilbert, Mehrtens introduced a dichotomy of
countermodern (C-type for short) and modern (M-type for short), with
Klein construed as C-type and Hilbert as M-type (C- and M- notation
ours).
Mehrtens not only claimed that Klein was C-type but also dropped
both damaging innuendo that Klein may have ultimately been an en-
abler of the national-socialist ideology and odious allegations of racism,
as analyzed in Sections 3.4 and 4.3.
16This is not to imply that Mehrtens endorsed either Dingler’s or Bieberbach’s
views in the sense of their unsavory political or philosophical orientations. Nor is
it an assertion that Mehrtens’ own political or philosophical orientations are not
unsavory.
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Note that the onus is on Mehrtens to convince the reader that he is
pursuing a meaningful dichotomy of C-type versus M-type. We argue
that by pursuing extraneous issues, Mehrtens obscures the true vital
issues of the period, and moreover reveals his ideological parti pris in
the process.
3.4. Racism. Mehrtens’ page 520 contains no fewer than six occur-
rences of the term racism; thus, we find:
The case of Bieberbach as well as the behaviour of some
other mathematicians suggest the thesis that mathemat-
ical counter-modernism is correlated to nationalism and
eventually also to racism. (ibid.; emphasis added)
Furthermore,
Klein is indeed a representative of counter-modernism,
but his racism is more of the theoretical type. (ibid.;
emphasis added)
Mehrtens’ procedure here is objectionable on several counts:
• The juxtaposition of the two passages (one on Bieberbach and
one on Klein) in close proximity suggests a spurious affinity
between them;
• the claim of being a “racist of a theoretical type” presupposes
being a racist in the first place, an allegation against Klein that
Mehrtens has not yet established.
Now the term racist can be given (at least) two distinct meanings:
(1) someone interested in analyzing differences in intellectual out-
look among distinct ethnicities (racist1 );
(2) someone who believes in the inferiority of one ethnicity to an-
other based on such differences, and advocates corrective action
(racist2 ).
Klein’s discussions of ethnic differences possibly make him racist1. Yet
Mehrtens’ comments on Bieberbach clearly indicate that Mehrtens has
racist2 in mind when he uses the term:
When the National Socialists came to power in 1933,
[Bieberbach] attempted to find political backing for his
counter-modernist perspective on mathematics, and de-
clared both, intuition and concreteness, to be the in-
born characteristic of the mathematician of the German
race, while the tendency towards abstractness and un-
concrete logical subtleties would be the style of Jews and
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of the French (Mehrtens 1987). He thus turned counter-
modernism into outright racism and anti-modernism.
(Mehrtens [41, p. 519]; emphasis added)
Thus the racism case against Klein as found in Mehrtens [41] is based
on equivocation on the meaning of the term racist. The remaining
four occurrences of the term racism on page 520 in Mehrtens are less
tendentious; yet Mehrtens’ reader can well wonder why the issue is
being discussed in such detail at all, if pinning a latent racism slur on an
allegedly C-type Klein were not one of Mehrtens’ intentions. Mehrtens
goes so far as to imply a connection between Klein’s comments and the
Nationalsozialismus ; see Section 4.3.
The historical record indicates that Klein struggled valiantly to hire
Jewish mathematicians like Hurwitz and Schoenflies, and conducted a
warm correspondence with Pasch, Gordan, and others. Klein at times
put his own reputation on the line to do so, as in his correspondence
with Althoff concerning the promotion of Schoenflies.17
Mehrtens’ strategy in the face of such facts is
(1) to acknowledge that Klein appreciated some Jewish mathemati-
cians, but
(2) to claim that this does not contradict Mehrtens’ thesis that
Klein, perhaps unwittingly and without foreseeing the criminal
abuses that were to come, produced texts and personal state-
ments which were grist to the mill of antisemitic tendencies in
Germany at the time [39, p. 217].
This stance of Mehrtens’ amounts to assignment of guilt by association
and therefore represents a character smear against Klein.
3.5. Internationalism. Mehrtens goes on to raise the issue of inter-
nationalism:
The converse proposition would be that modernism is
related to liberalism and internationalism. Indeed, the
leading representative of the modem style, David Hilbert,
can be rated as a liberal and an internationalist. (Mehrtens
[41, p. 520])
17Schoenflies went on to do work fundamental for both group theory and modern
spectroscopy. This work is widely used to this day. His correspondence with Fedorov
aimed at correcting errors in earlier versions of their classification of crystallographic
groups is one famous early example of the modern phenomenon of mathematicians
from different linguistic communities collaborating incrementally to arrive at a valid
result; see Schwarzenberger [56, pp. 162–163].
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A reader would gather from this comment that Klein may perhaps not
be rated as a liberal, being a C-type contrary to Hilbert’s M-type (see
Section 3.3). In his review of Mehrtens’ approach, Albert Lewis aptly
remarked:
The two world wars and their aftermaths brought out
the stark contrast between international and national
mathematical biases while the center of gravity of math-
ematical activity moved towards the United States.
(Lewis [36]; emphasis added)
Indeed, relative to the national vs international dichotomy mentioned
by Lewis, Felix Klein’s outlook clearly belongs to the latter (as correctly
pointed out by Dingler; see Section 3.1), which is the opposite of the
countermodern role Mehrtens seeks to pin on Klein.
3.6. What is mathematical modernism? Mehrtens ’93. Her-
bert Mehrtens and other historians “have attempted to give a Marx-
ist analysis of the connection between mathematics and productive
forces, and there have been philosophical studies about the commu-
nication processes involved in the production of mathematical knowl-
edge” (Mehrtens et al. [42, pp. ix–x]). In a 1993 text, Mehrtens posits
that
a scientific discipline exchanges its knowledge products
plus political loyalty in return for material resources plus
social legitimacy. (Mehrtens [40, p. 220])
Readers concerned that that the tools of a crude marxism may not
provide sufficient discrimination to deal with delicate issues of the
transformation that took place in mathematics at the beginning of
the 20th century, will have their apprehensions confirmed when they
reach Mehrtens’ definition of modernism:
By 1930 it was quite clear what the term modern meant
when applied to mathematics: the conceptual study of
abstract mathematical concepts characterized by axioms
valid for sets or other undefined elements and presented
by proceeding from the elementary concepts to the more
complicated structures; a hierarchical system of mathe-
matical truths rigorously proved, the language applied
having hardly any other function than to label the ob-
jects and to ensure the validity of statements. “Mod-
ern” mathematics in this sense had no extramathemat-
ical meaning, did not indicate possible fields or objects
of application, was devoid of hints to the historical or
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heuristical background of the theory, and at most was
in a highly implicit manner structured along didactical
guidelines. (Mehrtens [40, p. 224]; emphasis added)
Among the problematic aspects of Mehrtens’ definition of modernism
are the following:
(1) Mehrtens makes no distinction between the levels of language
and metalanguage, or mathematics and metamathematics, which
are essential to understanding Hilbert’s finitist program;
(2) Mehrtens rules out applications by definition (in his second sen-
tence), as well as didactic concerns (little wonder Klein didn’t
fare well in Mehrtens’ book);
(3) meaning is ruled out by definition, which would exclude Hilbert
from Mehrtens’ modernism;
(4) Mehrtens’ dismissive comment on history (“devoid of hints to
the historical . . . background of the theory”) flies in the face
of the fact that Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie explicitly
refers to Euclid’s Elements.
To elaborate on the last point, note that Hilbert deals not merely
with the axioms but also with Euclid’s theory of area and theory of
proportion. Hilbert incorporates the perspective of Euclid as an organic
part of his presentation in the Grundlagen (see Hilbert [24]). Mehrtens
goes on to claim that
The central cognitive definition of mathematics by its
pure, modern core was related to those task-oriented
fields [of applied mathematics and mathematical peda-
gogy]. (Mehrtens [40, p. 226]; emphasis added)
However, the positing of a “pure, modern core” by Mehrtens remains
a mere assumption echoing those made two pages earlier. Mehrtens
continues with a thinly veiled dig against Klein’s book [31]:
Lectures on “elementary mathematics from higher stand-
point” served . . . to relate the pedagogical branch to the
development of scientific mathematics, and to attempt
to axiomatize mathematical theories for physics aimed
at an immediate relation between this field of applica-
tion and pure mathematics. (Mehrtens [40, p. 226])
Again, the exclusion of applications from the “pure, modern” realm is
assumed rather than argued by Mehrtens. His reader may be justifiably
shocked to learn that
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In a lecture in 1926 [Bieberbach] sharply attacked [David]
Hilbert, the dean of mathematical modernity, and de-
picted modern theories as ‘skeletons in the sand of the
desert of which nobody knows whence they come and
what they have served for.’ (Mehrtens [40, p. 227])
However, the suitably shocked reader may well feel it to be a weakness
of Mehrtens’ depiction of Klein as a C-type, since obviously no similar
anti-Hilbert lecture was ever given or imagined by Klein. Mehrtens
wants us to believe that
the social system of mathematics was (and is) interested
not in meaning but rather in production. The compet-
ing formalist style was obviously productive, and the
corresponding foundational research program, Hilbert’s
‘metamathematics,’ imposed no restrictions on existing
mathematical theories except the demand for logical co-
herence. (Mehrtens [40, p. 230]; emphasis added)
Was Hilbert in fact interested in production rather than meaning as
Mehrtens claims here? Mehrtens probably believes that, too. However,
he presents no evidence to support such a sweeping claim that is more
revealing of his (Mehrtens’) ideological commitments than of Hilbert’s
views, as is Mehrtens’ comment to the effect that
In [Hilbert’s] program, mathematics is of the highest
generality, and meaning and utility of new knowledge
are hardly visible anymore.18 (Mehrtens [39, p. 380];
emphasis added)
On Hilbert’s commitment to meaning and utility, pace Mehrtens, see
further in Section 4.11.
3.7. What is mathematical modernism? Mehrtens ’96. In 1996
Mehrtens provides an additional definition of mathematical modernism:
“The counter-modernist attitude arises with modernism” [41, p. 522]
and
It is part of modernity of the modern world. Turning
to the political side of my topic, I want to state very
briefly the sociological argument. I take mathemati-
cal modernism to be the defining center of a socially
modernized professional and autonomous mathematics
18In the original: “In seinem Programm ist die Mathematik von ho¨chster Allge-
meinheit, und Sinn und Nutzen neuen Wissens sind kaum mehr zu erkennen.”
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business, concentrating and symbolizing itself as a re-
search discipline. Modernism is, so to speak, the avant-
garde of the profession, defining the real, the pure, and
the most progressive type of mathematics. The busi-
ness, however, includes much more than avant-garde re-
search. Mathematicians of a more conservative type or
mathematicians in applications, hybrid fields or in teach-
ing cannot fully identify with the modernist attitude.
(Mehrtens [41, p. 523]; emphasis added)
The problem with such a definition is that Klein becomes tautologously
a C-type here, because “mathematicians in applications” are defined
as incapable of fully identifying with the modernist attitude. The talk
about “socially modernized professional and autonomous mathematics
business” would indicate on the contrary that Klein is a modernist,
since nobody contributed to the flourishing of professional mathematics
institutions as he did.
Readers can wonder what “the real, the pure, and the most pro-
gressive type of mathematics” is exactly. Mehrtens defines modernist
mathematics as the real, the pure, and the most progressive type but
the definition seems circular. What is progressive mathematics if not
modern?
Readers can have similar doubts about the a priori exclusion of ap-
plied mathematicians from the rarefied realm of the modernist species.
Thus, Abraham Robinson published numerous articles in applied math-
ematics as well as a joint book called Wing theory [48] (yes, these are
airplane wings, not a branch of ring theory). Yet his philosophical
stance is close to Hilbert’s formalism; see Robinson’s essay “Formal-
ism 64” [50] which would normally gain him admittance to the select
modernist club if Mehrtens’ enthusiasm for David Hilbert’s formalism
is any guide.
Even more problematic for Mehrtens is the fact that Hilbert, like
Klein, was specifically interested in axiomatizing physics:
Another author who influenced Hilbert deeply during
this Ko¨nigsberg period was Heinrich Hertz, as reflected
in [Hilbert’s] sixth Paris problem, which pointed toward
the axiomatization of mathematical physics. (Rowe [54,
p. 180])
(See also Corry [11].) If applications are specifically excluded from
the realm of mathematical modernism, what is one to make of this
application to physics pursued by Mehrtens’ modernist hero Hilbert?
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When Mehrtens proclaims: “I take mathematical modernism to be
the defining center of a socially modernized. . . mathematics business,”
anyone with a background in (mathematical) logic might wonder how
one can define mathematical modernism in terms of modernized busi-
ness without committing an elementary logical error of circularity. In
short, what Mehrtens provides here is not a definition of modernism
but rather an assortment of cherry-picked conditions designed specifi-
cally to exclude. . . Felix Klein. Such a technique could be described
in popular parlance as moving the goalposts to score a point.
3.8. Stereotyping. Does it ever occur to Mehrtens that significant
differences may exist among the alleged C-types? The answer is that
it does, as when he speaks of
the individual who constructs himself as part of a higher
order, and who, from that higher order, . . . receives the
gift of a mathematical talent and thus the gift of insight
into that higher order. This applies to Poincare´, Klein,
Bieberbach and others, but not so much to the more rad-
ical and pessimistic Brouwer. I shall not discuss the in-
dividual differences here.” (Mehrtens [41, pp. 525–526];
emphasis added).
Mehrtens’ passage here is assorted with a footnote 6 offering tantalizing
glimpses into what such undiscussed differences might be:
6. But I would like to recall the ‘polythetic’ charac-
ter of concepts like ‘fundamentalism’. One could, ten-
tatively, divide the family resemblances into a ‘techno-
cratic’, progress-oriented group (Klein, Poincare´), a tra-
ditionalist or ‘mandarin’ group (Kronecker), and a ro-
mantic, mystical variant, connecting mathematical fun-
damentalism with a critique of progress and civilization
as Brouwer did. (Mehrtens [41, p. 526, note 6])
Alas, the reader never learns whether Bieberbach was fundamentalist,
mandarin, mystical, or technocratic; perhaps all of the above. We
therefore have the following classification into C-subtypes and their
leading representatives following Mehrtens:
C1 Bieberbach (fundamentalist?);
C2 Brouwer (mystical);
C3 Kronecker (mandarin);
C4 Klein, Poincare´ (technocrat).
We note that, pace Mehrtens, stereotyping mathematicians into such
categories serves no useful purpose if the historian’s goal is meaningful
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history, though it may well serve a goal of the production of marxist
historiography. In the end Mehrtens’ claim concerning Hilbert that he
was interested in production rather than meaning applies only to the
author of the claim.
Mehrtens’ systematic stereotyping reminds one of nothing more than
similar procedures adopted by his nemesis Bieberbach. Thus, Segal
summarizes Bieberbach’s racial theorizing as follows:
Gauss was also contrasted with Carl Gustav Jacobi (a
Jew). Jacobi was “oriental” and had a “heedless will to
push through his own personality.” Gauss was character-
ized as “nordisch-falisch,” a term borrowed from H.F.K.
Gunther’s racial theories; similarly, Euler was “ostisch-
dinarisch,” another similar term. (Segal [57, p. 363])
See there for a discussion of Bieberbach’s classification of J-types into
subtypes J1, J2, J3. Mehrtens’ final paragraph contains the following
gem:
When the ideology of sound, realist common sense had
crossed the border to Germany in the early thirties,
mathematical modernism took the opposite route with
a group of scholars that were to name themselves “Bour-
baki” and to become the last high priests of mathemat-
ical modernism before the post-modern era. (Mehrtens
[41, p. 527]; emphasis added)
It is unclear what meaningful historiographic purpose is served by
stereotyping the Bourbaki as “high priests.”
Mehrtens’ claim that in mathematics, modernism was followed by
something called post-modernism may strike many a reader as novel.
Then again such a reader may be unfamiliar with the intricacies of
the received academic lingo. What objective does it serve to postulate
a specifically post-modern phase in the development of mathematics?
We will venture an explanation in Section 3.9.
3.9. Late capitalism and Kramer’s diagnosis. Writes Gray:
Mehrtens’s critique was written in a post-Marxist spirit,
influenced by such writers as Foucault. Modernization,
for him, is not progress, it is also part of the catastro-
phe of Nazism. If he is less clear that the search for
meaning and a place in the world has its good side, it
is only because he sees more clearly the ways in which
late capitalism is antithetical to all of that. (Gray [18,
p. 10]; emphasis added)
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Here Gray clearly acknowledges the marxist source of Mehrtens’ inspi-
ration. Gray goes on to state:
Two further avowedly speculative chapters close [Mehrtens’]
book, which go further into cultural criticism than I
need to follow here.” (ibid., footnote 13; emphasis added)
The root of the dilemma, as far as cultural criticism is concerned, is
that Mehrtens and similar-minded marxist academics have a problem
with the symbiotic relationship between capitalism on the one hand,
and modernism and high culture on the other. After its revolution-
ary beginnings as a radical movement,19 modernism went on to enjoy
a symbiotic relationship with what Gray refers to as late capitalism,
providing the source of the enmity toward modernism on the part of
marxist academics disenchanted with bourgeois society. The said aca-
demics felt betrayed by modernism, and can therefore speak approv-
ingly only of postmodernism (or pop art), never of modernism itself,
as poignantly summarized by Hilton Kramer in his essay ‘Modernism
and its enemies’:
. . . This view may be summed up as follows: Mod-
ernism claimed to be revolutionary, it claimed to be anti-
bourgeois, it promised us a new world, but it turned out
to be a coefficient of bourgeois capitalist culture, after
all, and we therefore reject the claim of high culture and
must work to destroy the privileged status it enjoys in
the cultural life of the bourgeois democracies. (Kramer
[34, p. 13])
To Mehrtens, applied mathematics is similarly a “coefficient of bour-
geois capitalist culture” aiding and abetting not merely the bourgeois
democracies but the NS regime as well:
The plan for an international congress for mechanics in
Germany could be sold to the aircraft ministry as a ne-
cessity for productive aircraft research. (Mehrtens [40,
p. 237])
Thus any advocacy of mathematical modernism by a marxist academic
must start with defining away applications from the outset as counter -
modern–which is precisely what Mehrtens did in [41, p. 523] as dis-
cussed in Section 3.7. For further details on bellied capitalists see
Section 4.7 (especially note 41).
19In this connection, Mehrtens writes that modernity can be a radical stance: “die
mo¨gliche Radikalita¨t der Moderne” [39, p. 182].
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4. Mehrtens’ book
In his 1990 book, Mehrtens describes the modernist transformation
of mathematics in the early 20th century in Germany. According to
Mehrtens, such a transformation is embodied in Hilbert’s formalism
and Cantorian set theory.
4.1. Selective modernist transformation. Mehrtens frequently cites
Cantor’s famous dictum on freedom being the essence of mathematics,
but finesses the issues concerning the reality of mathematical objects
where Cantor held decidedly unmodern views laced with both theology
and metaphysics.
Oddly, Mehrtens does not mention Emmy Noether’s school of ab-
stract algebra, and only briefly notes the impression that van der Waer-
den’s book Moderne Algebra had made on the young Dieudonne´.
Whereas Gray treats Klein’s Erlangen Program (EP) as the first item
of his chapter “Mathematical Modernism Arrives” in [18], Mehrtens
sees Riemann’s Habilitation talk of 1854 as the beginnining of mod-
ernism (but see Section 4.2), and Klein’s EP as the first move of the
Gegenmoderne. Having described it in five pages, he devotes another
19 pages to the interpretation of footnote III of the EP, titled “U¨ber
den Wert ra¨umlicher Anschauung,” i.e., the value of spatial intuition.
Here Mehrtens elaborates the key thesis of his book, namely the
divide between mathematicians of respectively C-type and M-type (in
our terminology; see Section 3.3). Mehrtens quotes, among others,
Heidegger, Foucault, Marx, Kant and Einstein. This list of authors
indicates that the divide has little to do with mathematics proper,
but is concerned rather with the relation between mathematics and
reality. While theM-types (according to Mehrtens) saw mathematics as
a formal system detached from reality (Riemann had first developed an
abstract theory, and then applied it to space), the C-types (Klein among
them) insisted that “there is a true geometry which is not . . . intended
to be merely an illustrative form of more abstract investigations.”
The struggle between C-types and M-types became more heated in
the decades following, although Mehrtens fails to give a single example
of Klein having actively opposed modernism. Accordingly, Mehrtens
calls Klein an exponent of the kooperative Gegenmoderne [39, p. 207].
For Mehrtens, the Gegenmoderne culminated in the 1920s and 1930s
with Brouwer’s attack on Hilbert and with Bieberbach’s Deutsche Math-
ematik, and petered out afterwards. As is well known, Bieberbach
was hardly mainstream even among the German mathematicians of
his time, as evidenced by the landslide victory of the counter-proposal
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to Bieberbach’s proposal to adopt a Fu¨hrerprinzip within the Deutsche
Mathematiker-Vereinigung in the election held on 13 september 1934.
According to Mehrtens [38], Bieberbach’s proposal got 40 no-votes, 11
yes-votes, and 3 empty ballots, whereas the more moderate counter-
proposal got 38 yes-votes, 8 no-votes, with 4 abstentions.20
4.2. Riemann, Klein, Heidegger, Klein, Riemann. Riemann’s
viewpoint creates a problem for Mehrtens’ simplistic dichotomy of C-
type versus M-type. As Rowe points out,
the contrast [of Hilbert’s viewpoint on Euclidean geom-
etry] with Riemann’s viewpoint could not be sharper.
For the latter insisted that a refined understanding of
Euclidean geometry was a dead end. In fact, at the very
outset of his Habilitationsvortrag, Riemann proclaimed
that the study of the foundations of geometry from Eu-
clid to Legendre–seen as an empirical science–had re-
mained in the dark, owing to a failure to explore crucial
issues or hypotheses concerning physical measurements.
Natural philosophers thus lacked a general theory of ex-
tended magnitudes or, to use modern language, an un-
derstanding of differential geometry in arbitrary dimen-
sions. Axiomatics, on the other hand, plays virtually no
role in Riemann’s text, least of all speculations about a
theory of parallels. (Rowe [54, p. 179])
Riemann’s pervasive influence on modern mathematics ranges from the
theory of Riemann surfaces and Riemannian geometry to the Riemann
hypothesis and the deepest problems in number theory, and reaches as
far as category theory (see Marquis [37]).
Determined to frame Klein as a C-type, Mehrtens faces the formida-
ble challenge of Klein’s solid reputation as member of the Riemannian
tradition at Go¨ttingen. Mehrtens’ strategy to circumvent the challenge
is a tour de force of obfuscation.
Unable to deny Riemann’s sterling reputation as a modern, Mehrtens
concedes in [39, p. 67] that Riemann made ‘the first move of moder-
nity’. However, he then proceeds to paint a different picture, seeking
to portray Riemann as a romantic with pantheistic views. Mehrtens
attempts to back up his picture by collating and misrepresenting some
passages from fragmentary personal notes of Riemann’s (published
posthumously by Dedekind and Weber as [47]) and goes on to claim:
20The numbers reported by Mehrtens do not quite add up but the pattern is clear.
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In Riemann’s philosophical fragments there is talk of
an earth-soul, which is a moving, multifaceted thought-
process.21 (Mehrtens [39, p. 69])
Unable to detect an occurrence of either of the term Anschauung or In-
tuition in these fragments that would provide a figleaf of respectability
for Mehrtens’ (partial) C-typing of Riemann, Mehrtens seeks to con-
nect Riemann to Heidegger, whose name evokes the familiar sinister
associations.
Heidegger’s abrupt appearance on page 70 of Mehrtens’ book is fol-
lowed on page 71 by a quotation of the following difficult passage:
Cognition is a kind of representational thinking [Vorstellen].
In this presentation [Stellen] something we encounter
comes to stand [Stehen], to a standstill [Stand ]. What
is encountered and brought to a standstill in representa-
tional thinking is the object [Gegenstand ].22 (Heidegger
[21, p. 23])
In his introduction, Mehrtens describes his procedure (including Dis-
course Analysis) as follows:
The sixth chapter, which sums up the interpretatory
framework, and—using Discourse Analysis, Semiotics
and Semiology, and Poetology—develops the leitmotifs,
systematically and within the three images Eulenspiegel,
the Golem, and Mu¨nchhausen, was the last chapter that
I revised. (Mehrtens [39, p. 9]; emphasis added)
Examining pages 70–71 in [39] and applying such a ‘Discourse Analysis’
reveals that the names of Riemann (R), Klein (K), and Heidegger (H)
occur here in close succession in the following order:
R, R, K, K, H, K, R.
Mehrtens juxtaposes the names and accompanies them by obscure pas-
sages from fragments of Riemann’s personal notes and cryptic phrases
from Heidegger taken out of context, skillfully creating a flou artistique
21In the original: “In Riemanns philosophischen Fragmenten ist die Rede von einer
“Erdseele”, die ein bewegter, vielfa¨ltiger “Denkprozess” ist.”
22In the original: “Das Erkennen gilt als eine Art des Vorstellens. In diesem Stellen
kommt etwas, was uns begegnet, zum Stehen, zum Stand. Das im Vorstellen zum
Stand gebrachte Begegnende ist der Gegenstand” (Heidegger [20, p. 46]). The first
sentence does not appear in Mehrtens’ quotation of Heidegger, obscuring the mean-
ing of the already difficult passage.
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that suggests an affinity among the three protagonists, with an under-
current of damaging innuendo implicating both Riemann and Klein in
the swamp of Heidegger’s well-known forays into politics.23
4.3. Theodor Lessing and race. Mehrtens inserts some quotes from
an idiosyncratic article by philosopher Theodor Lessing in the midst
of a discussion of Felix Klein’s views in (Mehrtens [39, pp. 216–218]),
including Lessing’s unsourced speculations in [35, p. 235] regarding pos-
sible Jewish roots of Riemann, Weierstrass, and Klein himself (Less-
ing’s article, highly critical of Klein’s educational reform, was natu-
rally discussed in Klein’s seminar).24 Lessing’s speculations on race in
this passage are rather wild-eyed by modern standards. Without pro-
viding an evaluation of Lessing’s idiosyncratic speculations, Mehrtens
abruptly returns to analyzing Klein’s views, thereby implying guilt by
association on Klein’s part. A further example of assigning guilt by
association is the following passage:
The biologistic-racist discourse, which was an every-
day phenomenon in Wilhelmine Germany, and not only
there, and which Klein served and amplified, was con-
tinued in the Nationalsozialismus.25 [39, p. 217]
The issue of Klein’s alleged racism was dealt with in Section 3.4. For a
comparison of Klein’s position with that of Weierstrass see Section 2;
for Vahlen see Section 4.6. We will deal with the biologistic issue sep-
arately in Section 4.4 immediately following.
4.4. A nonconventional arsenal: the biologistischer stockpile.
In his book, Mehrtens repeatedly exploits the sinister adjective biolo-
gistisch:
(1) “Time and again mathematicians have observed that there is
a generalizable difference between geometric-anschaulich and
logical-algebraic thought. . . . Klein conceived of this difference
23In a similar vein, Mehrtens goes as far as to link both Poincare´ and Klein with
the tainted term Fu¨hrer in (Mehrtens [39, p. 577]). Related innuendo exploiting
the tainted term occurs also on pages 161, 252, 253, 254, 428, 576 in [39].
24Did Dingler’s claim that Klein was half-Jewish (see Section 3.1) have Lessing’s
speculation at its origin? This requires further research.
25In the original: “Der im wilhelminischen Deutschland und nicht nur dort
allta¨gliche biologistisch-rassistische Diskurs, den Klein bediente und versta¨rkte,
wurde im Nationalsozialismus fortgefu¨hrt.”
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as a difference of psychic dispositions, and he moreover takes
the step to biologisation when he writes, etc.”26 [39, p. 215];
(2) ‘biologistic-racist discourse’27 [39, p. 217];
(3) “The ‘pure gift of inspiration’ links the transcendental giver
with the biologistic conception of ‘gift’ and ‘selection’.’28
[39, p. 219];
(4) “The nationalistic or biologistic discourses/narratives of Volk
and Rasse, as well as the aggressively-heroic pathos of soldierly
masculinity were suitable to be connected with the self-image of
scientists, and also with the [prevailing] idea of science, this idea
having been used by/in countermodernity to defend meaning
and to defend relevance-for-reality.”29 [39, p. 313];
(5) “With hindsight it is all too evident that this30 had the potential
to biologistically articulate the possible conflict among these
civilized peoples.”31 [39, p. 345];
(6) “However, the reform-movement with [its newly coined terms
of] the ‘modern culture’ and the ‘functional thinking’, and with
its biologistic philosophical outlook, does not have anything to
do with the self-definition of science and its fields of application,
but is aimed at gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the general
26In the original: “Daß es jedoch einen verallgemeinerbaren Unterschied zwischen
geometrisch-anschaulich und logisch-algebraischem Denken gebe, ist von Mathe-
matikern immer wieder beobachtet worden. . . . Klein faßt sie naturalistisch als
eine Verschiedenheit psychischer Dispositionen auf und geht noch den Schritt zur
Biologisierung weiter, wenn er schreibt, etc.”
27In the original: “biologistisch-rassistische[r] Diskurs.” This item already appeared
in Section 4.3.
28In the original: “Die “rein geschenkte Eingebung” verbindet den transzendenten
Schenker mit der biologistischen Konzeption von Begabung und Auslese.” Note
that the German word Auslese (‘selection’) was routinely used in NS-ideology.
29In the original: “Die naturalistischen oder biologistischen Reden von Volk und
Rasse, ebenso wie das aggressiv-heroische Pathos soldatischer Ma¨nnlichkeit ließsen
sich mit dem Selbstbild der Wissenschaftler und dem Versta¨ndnis von Wissenschaft
verknu¨pfen, mit dem in der Gegegenmoderne Sinn und Wirklichkeitsbezug der the-
oretischen Wissenschaft verteidigt worden waren.”
30Here Mehrtens refers to Klein’s comments at Evanston in 1893 (see Section 4.9);
only a single sentence earlier, Klein’s name is mentioned, and associates Klein with
“the imperialist racism of the dominating ‘civilized peoples’” (the single quotation
marks around “civilized peoples’ are in the original).
31In the original: “Daß darin das Potential lag, den mo¨glichen Konflikt unter jenen
’Kulturnationen’ biologistisch zu artikulieren, ist im nachhinein allzu deutlich.”
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public and [is also aimed at] the cultural representation of the
new realities.”32 [39, p. 376]
Mehrtens’ biologistisches leitmotif creates a (clearly intended) impres-
sion of continuity between, on the one hand, Mehrtens’ case against
Klein and, on the other, Mehrtens’ case against the abuses of the NS
era. Such alleged continuity is spurious (see further in Section 4.5).
The kind of role Mehrtens sees for biology as far as NS ideology is
concerned is made crystal clear by the following passage:
A more obvious example from biology is the concept
‘instinct,’ which was productive in Nazi Germany, both
politically and scientifically, and served to mutually re-
inforce parts of Nazi ideology and biological ethology. . .
(Mehrtens [40, p. 229]; emphasis added)
Mehrtens’ indiscriminate use of the biologistischer stockpile against
Klein is not consistent with standards of meaningful historical scholar-
ship.
4.5. Kleinian continuities according to Mehrtens. Klein’s rather
commonplace description of mathematical platonism appears in his
1926 text:
One faction among the mathematicians thinks them-
selves unrestricted autocrats in their respective realm,
this realm being created of their own accord, according
to their own whim, by logical deductions; the other fac-
tion proceeds from the belief that science pre-exists [the
scientist], being in a state of ideal perfection, and that
all that falls to our lot is to discover, in lucky instants,
a limited new territory, as a piece [of that pre-existing
science].33 (Klein [32, p. 72])
32In the original: “Die Reformbewegung mit der ‘modernen Kultur’ und dem ‘funk-
tionalen Denken’, auch mit dem biologistischen Weltbild, aber hat gerade nicht
mit der Selbstdefinition von Wissenschaft und deren Praxisfeldern zu tun, sondern
zielt auf die o¨ffentliche Legitimita¨t und kulturelle Repra¨sentation der neuen Wirk-
lichkeiten.”
33In the original: “Die eine Gruppe von Mathematikern ha¨lt sich fu¨r unbeschra¨nkte
Selbstherrscher in ihrem Gebiet, das sie nach eigener Willku¨r logisch deduzierend
aus sich heraus schaffen; die andere geht von der Auffassung aus, daß die Wis-
senschaft in ideeller Vollendung vorexistiere, und daß es uns nur gegeben ist, in
glu¨cklichen Augenblicken ein begrenztes Neuland als Stu¨ck davon zu entdecken.
Nicht Erfinden nach Gutdu¨nken, sondern Auffinden des ewig Vorhandenen, nicht
die selbstbewußte Tat, sondern die vom Bewußtsein und Willen unabha¨ngige, rein
geschenkte Eingebung erscheint ihnen als das Wesen des Schaffens.”
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Mehrtens reacts to Klein’s comments on mathematical Platonism as
follows:
It transpires from the evaluative adjectives [employed
by Klein] how Klein places himself; this also agrees with
the ‘Kleinian continuities’, and with the countermodern
discourse: the “logic” and the “whim” of modernity are
the abhorrent antithesis to the rechter German mathe-
matician, who in pious modesty is receiving donations
of ‘eternal truth’, piecemeal, by way of “inspiration”
(read: ‘Anschauung’, ‘Intuition’).34 [39, p. 219] (em-
phasis added)
Mehrtens’ conclusion introduces a theological element into the discus-
sion:
The tone [of Klein’s voice] is religious. The devil is [in-
carnated in] other people; the ‘fall of man’ consists of
the [choice to use one’s] whim, and this whim does not
bow to the facts of truth and power.35 (ibid.)
The discrepancy between Klein’s comment and Mehrtens’ intemperate
reaction to it requires no amplification. The Talmudic dictum “kol
haposel, bemumo posel” (whoever disqualifies others, [it is] in his own
blemish [that he] disqualifies [them]) provides an insight into this pas-
sage, where Mehrtens himself coins the expression wertende Beiworte:
Klein never used the adjective abscheulich [‘abhorrent’] with regard to
any of the ideas mentioned: ‘logic’, ‘whim/arbitrariness’, or ‘moder-
nity’.36
34In the original: “Wo er sich selbst einordnet, ist in den wertenden Beiworten
deutlich und fu¨gt sich in Kleins Kontinuita¨ten und in den gegenmodernen Diskurs :
Die “Logik” und die “Willku¨r” der Moderne sind der abscheuliche Gegensatz
zum rechten deutschen Mathematiker, der in frommer Bescheidenheit die ‘ewige
Wahrheit’ stu¨ckchenweise aber “rein” durch “Eingebung” (sprich: Anschauung,
Intuition) geschenkt bekommt” (emphasis added).
35In the original: “Der Tonfall is religio¨s. Der Teufel, das sind die anderen; der
Su¨ndenfall ist die Willku¨r, die vor den Gegebenheiten der Wahrheit und der Macht
den Nacken nicht beugt.”
36Nor did Klein refer to non-formalist mathematicians as the ‘right’ mathemati-
cians. Mehrtens wishes to see a political statement in places where there is none.
In keeping with an apparently irrepressible urge to paint Klein as a right-wing
precursor of worse things to come, Mehrtens plays on an ambiguity of the Ger-
man adjective recht (it could mean either right-minded, righteous, or right-wing).
Furthermore, Klein did not use the religious term fromm anywhere, nor ewig, nor
Teufel, nor Su¨ndenfall, nor Macht. Mehrtens’ claim to the contrary is sheer fabri-
cation. It is not Klein but Mehrtens who struck a religious tone, contrasting with
the merely old-fashioned tone of Klein’s comment.
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The continuity alleged in Mehrtens’ passage is all Mehrtens’, not
Klein’s. Mehrtens’ procedure here is another example of massaging the
evidence.
4.6. The butterfly model from Klein to Vahlen. Writes Mehrtens:
Theodor Vahlen, who after 1933 was an executive of-
ficial in the ministry, and a professor in Berlin, gave,
on [15 may] 1923, an address on assuming his office as
rector [of University of Greifswald], in the usual tradi-
tion, speaking on ‘Value and Essence’ of mathematics,
and cited Klein’s racist distinctions within mathemat-
ics, and sharpened them into open antisemitism.37 [39,
p. 310–311] (emphasis added)
What we object to most is Mehrtens’ judgmental phrase ‘Klein’s racist
distinctions.’ Here Mehrtens again equivocates on the meaning of a
loaded term (see Section 3.4), and furthermore implies a continuity
(and perhaps even organic necessity) between Klein’s remarks on eth-
nic differences on the one hand, and Vahlen’s “sharpened” open anti-
semitism, on the other. In the background of Mehrtens’ remarks is an
unspoken endorsement of the butterfly model of the evolution of ideas,
contrasted with the Latin model (see Ian Hacking [19, p. 119]).
Mehrtens’ allegation of continuity between the views of Klein and
those of Vahlen (who eventually reached the rank of SS-Brigadefu¨hrer)38
is an additional instance of assigning guilt by association, as well as a
character smear against Klein.
In line with the Talmudic dictum cited in Section 4.5, Mehrtens
seeks to argue a case of biological inevitability between the cocoon
of Klein’s remarks on intuition and race, on the one hand, and the
dragon-butterfly (see e.g., Benisch [5]) of the Nationalsozialismus, on
the other.
4.7. Imperialist fight and a 1908 cartoon. Mehrtens implicates
Klein in no less than an “imperialist competitive fight:”
37In the orginal: “Theodor Vahlen, nach 1933 leitender Ministerialbeamter und
Professor in Berlin, hielt 1923 eine Rektoratsrede in einschla¨giger Tradition ‘Wert
und Wesen’ der Mathematik und zitierte Kleins rassistische Unterscheidungen in
der Mathematik und verscha¨rfte sie zu offenem Antisemitismus” (emphasis added).
Mehrtens’ reference to “Professor in Berlin, hielt 1923 eine Rektoratsrede, etc.”
may give the impression that Vahlen gave the antisemitic address at Berlin, since
the word ‘Greifswald’ is relegated to a footnote, and ‘Universita¨tsreden’ is omitted,
making it appear more significant than it actually was (Greifswald is a small city).
38See Sto¨wer [59, p. 145, note 349].
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In the same year [1901, in a speech] before the ‘support
club’39 Klein emphasizes “the importance of [higher] ed-
ucation in mathematics and the sciences in the com-
petitive fight of the nations, and of the general cultural
significance of high school education, and of a capable
class of high school teachers supported by public trust.”
If the higher totality is culture, then the concrete to-
tality is the nation in the imperialist competitive fight.
. . . The goal was to define a modern culture in such a
way, and to make it a state affair in such a way, that the
professionals in natural- and social sciences, economics
and bureaucracy rise to the rank of a state elite.40 [39,
p. 361] (emphasis on ‘modern’ in the original; emphasis
on ‘imperialist competitive fight’ added)
The tone of the above passage is consistent with the identification of
the source of the enmity toward modernism on the part of marxist
academics and Hilton Kramer’s diagnosis thereof (see Section 3.9).
That the driving force behind Mehrtens’ animus toward Klein is
marxist detestation of capitalism is confirmed by Mehrtens’ analysis
of a cartoon reproduced at [39, p. 381]. The cartoon represents the
activities of the Go¨ttinger Vereinigung founded by Klein, formed to en-
courage interactions between the Academy and Industry. The cartoon
depicts recognizably professorial types exchanging books for proverbial
moneybags brought by recognizably capitalist types.41 Hovering over
39This is a reference to an association charged with carrying out the reforms in the
teaching of mathematics and science in German-speaking high school teaching.
40In the original: “Im gleichen Jahr betonte Klein vor dem Fo¨rderverein 〉〉die Be-
deutung des mathematisch-naturwissenschaftlichen Studiums im Konkurrenzkampf
der Nationen und die allgemeine Kulturbedeutung der ho¨heren Schule und eines
leistungsfa¨higen, vom o¨ffentlichen Vertrauen getragenen Standes der Studienra¨te.〈〈
Wenn das ho¨here Ganze die Kultur ist, dann ist das konkrete Ganze die Nation im
imperialistischen Konkurrenzkampf. . . . Es kam darauf an, eine moderne Kultur
so zu definieren und zur Staatsangelegenheit zu machen, daß die beteiligten Profes-
sionellen aus Natur- und Sozialwissenschaft, Wirtschaft und Bu¨rokratie gemeinsam
in den Rang einer staatlichen Elite aufru¨ckten.”
41Mehrtens describes the cartoon as follows: “A contemporary caricature is more
precise [than the logo] in that regard (Figure 5). Therein, at the signpost pointing
towards the ‘Go¨ttinger Vereinigung’, professors, clad in cap and gown, and with a
large and a small book tucked under their arms, meet with the capitalists, unmis-
takable with their bellies and top hats, who carry a large and a small moneybag.
After exchanging the small book for the small moneybag, they push along in pairs,
engrossed in conversation” (translation ours). Mehrtens’ sarcastic tone indicates
that he views the cartoon as a satirical caricature; see note 42.
36 J. B., P. B., P. H., M. K., J. S., AND D. S.
the scene are a sun-like Klein and an angelic-looking Althoff (see Sec-
tion 2.2), depicted as bestowing blessings upon the congregants. The
cartoon is dated at 1908 in also [22], [23], [44].
Mehrtens’ purpose in reproducing the cartoon seems to be to com-
pare it to the logo of the Go¨ttinger Vereinigung which depicts a allegor-
ical scene alluding to academic-industrial interactions. Thus, Mehrtens
declares the cartoon to be a ‘more accurate’ (“genauer”) representation
of the activities of the Go¨ttinger Vereinigung than the official logo (see
[39, p. 382]).42 Mehrtens’ own attitude toward such activities is spelled
out clearly enough in the pages leading up to the cartoon:
The disposition over technical knowledge is being regu-
lated via legal norms, by patent laws, and by laws for
the protection of various secrets, in such a way that
said knowledge is co-opted for use within the capital-
ist market, and for use within the military state.43 [39,
pp. 378–379] (emphasis added)
Mehrtens’ skillful insinuation of a connection between Klein and the
military state finds its full expression in Mehrtens’ treatment of Theodor
Vahlen; see Section 4.6.
4.8. Modernism in America. According to Mehrtens, after the war
modernism triumphed and culminated in the works of Nicolas Bour-
baki [39, p. 320]. However, this is a simplistic view of mathematical
modernism. Thus, Mehrtens makes no mention of the debate over
modernist ideas in America. Notably, Marshall Stone claimed that
while several important changes have taken place in our
conception of mathematics or in our points of view con-
cerning it, the one which truly involves a revolution in
42While Mehrtens interprets the cartoon as a satirical caricature of the goings-on at
the Go¨ttinger Vereinigung, Hermann and Scho¨nbeck note in [23, Caption on p. 355]
that the cartoon was sent out (as part of the invitation letter) by the organizers of
the conference themselves (apparently in self-deprecating humor). Ohse et al. [44,
p. 373] note that the cartoon displays the following text: “Gruss vom Festkommers
zur Feier des 10-ja¨hrigen Bestehens der Go¨ttinger Vereinigung Go¨ttingen, 22. Febr.
1908” (translation: “Greetings from the Commercium on the occasion of the 10th
anniversary of the existence of the Go¨ttinger Vereinigung Go¨ttingen, 22 february
1908”). The source for the cartoon is given as follows: Archiv der Aerodynamischen
Versuchsanstalt, Prandtl Zimmer, Ordner 〉〉Go¨ttinger Vereinigung 1905-1919〈〈.
43In the original: “Mit Patentrecht und Geheimnisschutz wird die Verfu¨gung u¨ber
technisches Wissen durch Rechtsnormen so reguliert, daß es fu¨r den kapitalistischen
Markt und den Milita¨rstaat zugerichtet wird” (emphasis added).
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ideas is the discovery that mathematics is entirely in-
dependent of the physical world (except that thinking
takes place in the brain). (Stone [58, p. 716])
Stone’s idea of mathematics as independent of the physical world was
eventually picked up by Quinn; see Bair et al. [2].
In response to Stone’s paper a symposium was held. Here Richard
Courant, who was in many respects Klein’s heir, had this to say:
Certainly mathematical thought operates by abstrac-
tion; mathematical ideas are in need of abstract pro-
gressive refinement, axiomatization, crystallization. It
is true indeed that important simplification becomes
possible when a higher plateau of structural insight is
reached. . . . Yet, the life blood of our science rises
through its roots ; these roots reach down in endless ram-
ification deep into what might be called reality, whether
this “reality” is mechanics, physics, biological form, eco-
nomic behavior, geodesy, or, for that matter, other math-
ematical substance already in the realm of the familiar.
(Courant in Carrier et al. [9]; emphasis added)
Courant’s tree metaphor, later elaborated by Kline, contrasted with
the Bourbaki–Tucker city metaphor; see Phillips [45] for an analysis.
Courant continued:
Abstraction and generalization is not more vital for math-
ematics than individuality of phenomena and, before all,
not more than inductive intuition. Only the interplay
between these forces and their synthesis can keep math-
ematics alive and prevent its drying out into a dead
skeleton. . . . We must not accept the old blasphemous
nonsense that the ultimate justification of mathemati-
cal science is ‘the glory of the human mind’. (Courant
in [9])
Similarly, a letter by Morris Kline and others claimed that the rele-
vance of mathematics for students emerges from concrete situations,
not formalisms; Kline was to argue his point most forcefully in [33].
The history of modernism in mathematics is more complex than Her-
bert Mehrtens is willing to grant.
4.9. Klein’s Evanston lectures. Klein gave twelve lectures at North-
western University at Evanston in 1893. The published version of the
lectures occupies 98 pages. His sixth lecture contains the following
passage:
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[Alfred] Ko¨pcke,44 of Hamburg, has advanced the idea
that our space-intuition is exact as far as it goes, but
so limited as to make it impossible for us to picture to
ourselves curves without tangents.
On one point Pasch does not agree with me, and that
is as to the exact value of the axioms. He believes – and
this is the traditional view – that it is possible finally
to discard intuition entirely, basing the whole science on
the axioms alone. I am of the opinion that, certainly, for
the purposes of research it is always necessary to com-
bine the intuition with the axioms. I do not believe, for
instance, that it would have been possible to derive the
results discussed in my former lectures, the splendid re-
searches of Lie, the continuity of the shape of algebraic
curves and surfaces, or the most general forms of trian-
gles, without the constant use of geometrical intuition.
Pasch’s idea of building up the science purely on the
basis of the axioms has since been carried still farther
by Peano, in his logical calculus.
Finally, it must be said that the degree of exactness of
the intuition of space may be different in different indi-
viduals, perhaps even in different races. It would seem
as if a strong naive space-intuition were an attribute
pre-eminently of the Teutonic race, while the critical,
purely logical sense is more fully developed in the Latin
and Hebrew races. A full investigation of this subject,
somewhat on the lines suggested by Francis Galton in
his researches on heredity, might be interesting. (Klein
[29, p. 45–46]; emphasis added)
Klein’s tentative comments on Teutonic, Hebrew, and Latin races, oc-
cupying a total of 6 lines in a 98-page text, were made in the context
of
• a discussion of Kopcke’s views concerning space-intuition;
• an appreciation of Pasch’s accomplishment vis-a-vis the foun-
dations;
• Klein’s disagreement with Pasch with regard to the role of in-
tuition in the creative process.
We propose our own tentative interpretation of the “Teutonic, Latin,
Hebrew” (T, L, H) comment. Confronted with the striking diffence in
44Mathematician, 1852–1927, doctoral student of Leo Ko¨nigsberger 1875 at Heidel-
berg.
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mathematical style between Ko¨pcke (T) of Hamburg and Pasch (H),
Klein is led to speculate on possible ethnic origins of such differences,
with the remark about the Latin races added because of Klein’s aware-
ness of the axiomatic/foundational contribution of the Italian mathe-
matician Peano (L). Historian Sanford Segal reacted to Klein’s state-
ments as follows:
For Klein, though certainly a conservative nationalist,
was also certainly no anti-Semite–he had helped bring
first Hermann Minkowski and then Edmund Landau as
well as Karl Schwarzschild to Go¨ttingen, and spoke fa-
vorably of the emancipation of the Jews in Prussia in
1812 (by Napoleon Bonaparte): “With this action a
large new reservoir of mathematical talent was opened
up for our country, the powers of which, coupled with
the increase therein achieved by the French emigrants,
very soon proved itself fruitful in our science.” He also
had good relations with a number of Jewish mathemati-
cians and had an extensive correspondence with his good
friend Max Noether (Emmy’s father): eighty-nine let-
ters from Noether and 129 from Klein, often addressed
“Lieber Noether”. (Segal [57, p. 270])
We will analyze Mehrtens’ rather different reaction in Section 4.10 im-
mediately following.
4.10. Mehrtens on Klein’s 6-line comment. Historian Sanford Se-
gal’s relaction to Klein’s statements appears above (Section 4.9). The
reaction to the same statements by Mehrtens is on record:
It was less antisemitism or racist nationalism which found
its expression in [Klein’s] statements, rather it was the
imperialist racism of the dominating civilized peoples;
this means that Klein gave an internationalist argumen-
tation, by implicitly mentioning the limits of the Inter-
nationalism of his time. That [Klein’s comments] had
the potential to enable others to articulate possible con-
flict between those ‘civilized nations’ biologistically, is,
with hindsight, all too clear.45 (Mehrtens [39, p. 345])
45In the original: “Weniger Antisemitismus oder rassistischer Nationalismus kam
hier zum Ausdruck als eher der imperialistische Rassismus der dominierenden ‘Kul-
turvo¨lker’; das heißt, Klein argumentierte internationalistisch, indem er implizit die
Grenzen des zeitgeno¨ssischen Internationalismus mit ansprach. Daß darin das Po-
tential lag, den mo¨glichen Konflikt unter jenen ‘Kulturnationen’ biologistisch zu
40 J. B., P. B., P. H., M. K., J. S., AND D. S.
It appears that antisemitism, racism, imperialism, domination, and
(especially the sinister) biologism (see Section 4.4) are the first things
that come to Mehrtens’ mind when reading Klein’s tentative comments
on space-intuition and possible differences among ethnicities in intel-
lectual outlook. As we already noted in Section 3.4, Mehrtens’ racism
slur against Klein is based on equivocation.
Mehrtens’ diatribe against Klein rings particularly hollow to a reader
aware of Mehrtens’ cynical exploitation of the infamous yellow star
badge in his comments on Hilbert:
Hilbert’s [set-theoretic] paradise is a dictatorship. . . The
yellow star is, when viewed mathematically, pure set-
building.46 (Mehrtens [39, p. 460])
Mehrtens’ flippant “set-building” comment comes disturbingly close to
an odious trivialisation of the yellow star badge, a tragic symbol of the
Holocaust.
4.11. Mehrtens and Gray on Hilbert. Mehrtens presents Hilbert
as the arch-modernist (“Generaldirektor der Moderne”). In Gray’s
words:
Hilbert in particular has a major role, and his work is
presented ironclad as a program to make all of mathe-
matics abstract, axiomatic and internally self-consistent.
(Gray [18, p. 10])
However, such a view of Hilbert’s posture is based on a very selective
reading of his works, taking into account only the Grundlagen der
Geometrie and his work on the logical foundations of mathematics in
the 1920s.
On Hilbert’s Zahlbericht, Corry writes: “The general idea of algebra
as the discipline dealing with algebraic structures is still absent from
Hilbert’s work on algebraic number theory” (Corry [12, p. 154]).
The same can be said concerning Hilbert’s papers on integral equa-
tions, which were written between 1904 and 1910 in the language of
classical analysis, and are far from the foundational work on abstract
function spaces that was done at the same time by Fre´chet, Riesz and
Schmidt. Hilbert never ventured into a study of such spaces.
Corry quotes a passage from a 1905 lecture, which illustrates Hilbert’s
rather informal approach to axiomatics:
artikulieren, ist im nachhinein allzu deutlich” (an excerpt of this quotation already
appeared in Section 4.4).
46In the original: “Das Hilbertsche Paradies ist eine Diktatur. . . Der gelbe Stern
ist, mathematisch gesehen, reine Mengenbildung.”
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The edifice of science is not raised like a dwelling, in
which the foundations are first firmly laid and only then
one proceeds to construct and to enlarge the rooms. Sci-
ence prefers to secure as soon as possible comfortable
spaces to wander around and only subsequently, when
signs appear here and there that the loose foundations
are not able to sustain the expansion of the rooms, it
sets about supporting and fortifying them. This is not
a weakness, but rather the right and healthy path of
development. (Hilbert quoted in Corry [14])
The following quotation from the foreword to the translation of Hilbert
and Cohn-Vossen’s Anschauliche [!] Geometrie [25] shows Hilbert in
agreement with Klein with regard to the interplay between abstraction
and intuition:
In mathematics, as in any scientific research, we find two
tendencies present. On the one hand, the tendency to-
ward abstraction seeks to crystallize the logical relations
inherent in the maze of material that is being studied,
and to correlate the material in a systematic and or-
derly manner. On the other hand, the tendency toward
intuitive understanding fosters a more immediate grasp
of the objects one studies, a live rapport with them, so
to speak, which stresses the concrete meaning of their
relations.
As to geometry, in particular, the abstract tendency
has here led to the magnificent systematic theories of
Algebraic Geometry, of Riemannian Geometry, and of
Topology; these theories make extensive use of abstract
reasoning and symbolic calculation in the sense of alge-
bra. Notwithstanding this, it is still as true today as
it ever was that intuitive understanding plays a major
role in geometry. And such concrete intuition is of great
value not only for the research worker, but also for any-
one who wishes to study and appreciate the results of
research in geometry.
Here Hilbert can hardly be said to be involved in an ironclad program
of making all of mathematics abstract and axiomatic. The empiricist
inclinations in Hilbert’s work in geometry are studied by Corry [13].
Notes Rowe:
As Michael Toepell has convincingly shown, Anschauung
held an important place in Hilbert’s geometrical work,
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and he was by no means convinced that one could ulti-
mately dispense with it altogether. (Rowe [53, p. 197])
As far as the relationship between Klein and Hilbert is concerned,
Mehrtens claims that Klein, described as the jupiter of Go¨ttingen, “tol-
erated Hilbert’s formalism”:
It pertains to the [concept of] Unordnung [disorder] that
Felix Klein, the Jupiter of Go¨ttingen, and the defender
of Anschauung, became an advocate of university ed-
ucation for women and tolerated Hilbert’s formalism,
and is not so disorderly after all, if one takes into con-
sideration Liebermann, the Secession, and the male self-
construction in the portrait [of Klein by M. Liebermann]
(cf. 7.2).47 (Mehrtens [39, p. 577])
Since the bulk of Hilbert’s work with Bernays on Formalism and foun-
dations started at about the time of Klein’s death, Mehrtens’ comment
is an ahistorical collage in addition to involving an unhelpful stereo-
type.
5. Conclusion: Mehrtens’ tools
In sum, this particular marxist historian has exploited a variety of
tools in his analysis of Klein that ranges from massaging the evidence
(Sections 1.6, 4.5) and character smear (Sections 3.4, 4.6) to assigning
guilt by association (Sections 4.3, 4.6) and ahistorical collage (Sec-
tion 4.11).
On occasion, Mehrtens sheds the mask of a marxist historian and en-
gages in what is discernibly bourgeois yellow journalism, as in Mehrtens’
tale concerning the dress embroidered with images of analytic curves
with which Felix Klein allegedly “covered the body” of his bride, the
tale in question being further embroidered by Mehrtens’ tasteless com-
ments at [39, p. 214].
Mehrtens’ claim that Hilbert was interested in production rather
than meaning applies only to the claim’s author. Mehrtens’ portrayal
of Klein as countermodern is contrary to much historical evidence and
must be rejected.
47In the original: “Daß Felix Klein, der Jupiter Go¨ttingens und Verteidiger der
Anschauung, fu¨r das Frauenstudium eintrat und den Formalismus Hilberts to-
lerierte, geho¨rt zur Unordnung und ist im u¨brigen so ordnungslos nicht, denkt man
an Liebermann, die Secession und die ma¨nnliche Selbstkonstruktion im Portra¨t
(vgl. 7.2).”
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